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trine: ". . . the rule persists merely as one of the law's
anachronisms which should be consigned to the limbo of
time-worn dogma." For a footnote to this statement, this
writer remarked about the doctrine and about the London
Guarantee case: "But, alas, even so moribund a doctrine
is not thus easily relegated. In a recent Maryland case
(the London Guarantee case) it appears as serenely as
though the light of modern legal reasoning had not dis-
owned it."
It would seem that the situation is ripe for statutory
reform. Why should not there be a statute passed per-
mitting suits to be brought in Maryland to collect damages
for the wrongful death of persons occurring elsewhere?
Such a statute could well provide rules for resolving
problems of dissimilarity, so long as the law applicable to
the tort should afford a substantial right of action for the
death.' 9 In the event of statutory reform to repeal the rule
of Davis v. Ruzicka and its precedent cases, thought might
well be given also to reforming the internal details of our
own wrongful death laws. Is there any real argument for
preserving the distinction between the separate actions for
the death itself and for the suffering endured by the victim
between the time of the fatal accident and the ensuing
death? For that matter, what justification is there for the
present rule requiring the action of the former type to be
brought in the name of the state as nominal plaintiff?
VENUE OF SUIT AGAINST DOMESTIC CORPORA-
TION. M. J. GROVE LIME CO. V. WOLFENDEN.1
The M. J. Grove Lime Company, a Maryland corporation
having its principal office in Frederick County, was sued in
the Superior Court of Baltimore City for damages arising
out of an automobile accident in Frederick County. The
sole activities of the corporation in Baltimore City consisted
of the solicitation of orders, which were subsequently ac-
19 The statute proposed by the Bar Association of Baltimore City, Daily
Record, February 2, 1937, and Ibid., February 3, 1937, does not go this
far. It merely seeks to make it possible to bring suits In Maryland for
wrongful deaths caused elsewhere. It provides that the "Courts of this
State shall apply the law of such other State, District of Columbia, or
territory of the United States, to the facts of the particular case, as
though such foreign law were the law of this state . . ." and that local
rules of pleading and procedure shall apply to the end that they shall
"give effect to the rights and obligations created by and existing under
the laws of the foreign jurisdiction..." where the tort occurred.
SMd.- , 188 Atl. 794 (1937).
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cepted by the company at its Frederick County office; occa-
sional delivery of merchandise pursuant to said orders; oc-
casional receipt of payments by the Baltimore City agent,
and consultation by officers of the company with public of-
ficials in connection with the submission of bids for public
work. The company had no office in Baltimore City, al-
though its sales agent in that district had previously, for a
short time, been listed in the telephone directory as agent
of the company. Held, that the company was not "carrying
on any regular business, or habitually engaging in any avo-
cation or employment" in Baltimore City, within the mean-
ing of Maryland Code, Art. 75, Sec. 157, and that the Su-
perior Court had no jurisdiction.
The statute cited by the Court was regularly applied to
suits against corporations prior to the enactment of Article
23, Section 103 in its present form.2 An example of such
application is Henderson v. Maryland Home InsuranceCo.3 However, Article 23, Section 103 now regulates spe-
cifically the question of venue in a suit against a corpora-
tion, and it may be suggested therefore that Article 75, Sec-
tion 157 no longer has any proper application to such suits.
The applicable provision of Section 103 is as follows:
"Every corporation of this State may be sued in any
county or in the City of Baltimore, as the case may be,
where its principal office is located, or where it regularly
transacts business or exercises its franchises, or in any lo-
cal action, where the subject matter thereof lies." (Italics
ours.)
Language of substantially the same tenor is found in
the statute regulating suits against foreign corporations.'
Hence, authorities on what constitutes "doing business"
within the meaning of one of these statutes may properly be
considered as applicable in the construction of the other.
The Court in its instant decision cites and relies upon the
case of Stewart Fruit Co. v. Railroad Co.,5 holding that the
solicitation of orders for freight by a foreign corporation
does not constitute doing business. Evidently the Court had
2 The applicable sentence was introduced by Acts, 1908, Ch. 240, See. 62.
Previously the statute relating to venue of suits against corporations con-
tained language similar to Md. Code, Art. 75, Sec. 157, as, for example,
Acts, 1900, Ch. 21 (amending Md. Code, Art. 23, Sec. 296).
90 Md. 47, 44 Atl. 1020 (1899).
4 Md. Code, Art. 23, Sec. 118 provides that a foreign corporation "reg-
ularly doing business or regularly exercising any of its franchises" in the
State is subject to suit therein, and permits such suit to be brought in the
county in which its principal office in the State is located or in any county
In which it "regularly transacts business."
- 143 Md. 56, 121 Atl. 837 (1923).
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in mind the same tests, in construing Article 75, Section 157,
which it would have applied if Article 23, Section 103 had
been brought to its attention6 and the decision seems in
line with the substantial weight of authority.7
Many of the cases, however, involving solicitation of or-
ders, hold that a foreign corporation engaging in such ac-
tivity is not required to qualify and pay a franchise tax,
not on the ground that it is not "doing business," but on the
ground that such business is interstate commerce. Under
these authorities solicitation of orders may render a cor-
poration subject to the jurisdiction of the courts. The par-
ticular significance of the present decision is that the Mary-
land Court appears to regard the regular solicitation of or-
ders as not in fact the doing of business. Although consider-
ations relating to undue burdens on interstate commerce
were not present, the Court evidently felt that the same
tests should be applied as in the case of foreign corpora-
tions, and thus avoided the confusion which would result
from adopting different standards for the two classes of
cases.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DELEGATION TO PRESI-
DENT OF POWER TO DECLARE EMBARGO ON
EXPORTATION OF ARMS. UNITED STATES
V. CURTISS-WRIGHT EXPORT
CORPORATION'
Defendants were indicted for conspiring to sell arms in
the United States to a foreign government in violation of
the Joint Resolution of Congress of May 28, 19342. In the
lower court, a demurrer to the indictment had been sus-
tained, on the ground that the joint resolution constituted
an improper delegation of power by Congress to the Presi-
dent.8 On appeal, held (one justice dissenting) :-Reversed
and cause remanded; the powers of the Federal Govern-
ment in respect of foreign affairs differ fundamentally in
origin and nature from its powers in respect of domestic
affairs; even assuming that the challenged legislation would
have constituted an improper delegation of power as to
8 Examination of the briefs in the principal case discloses that Art. 23,
Sec. 103 was not cited to the Court.
7 Prentice-Hall Corp. Service, Pars. 7120-7122.
- U. S. -, 81 L. Ed. 166, 57 S. Ct. 216 (1936).
48 Stat. 811 (1934).
'United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation, 14 F. Supp. 230
(S. D. N. Y. 1936).
